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Abstract 
Using data from the 1998 Wave of the Health and Retirement Study, we examine the 
effect of social interactions on the health insurance choices of the elderly. We find that having 
more social interactions, as measured by contacts with friends and neighbors, reduces the 
likelihood of enrolling in a Medicare managed care plan relative to purchasing a medigap policy 
or having coverage through Medicare alone. Our estimates indicate that social networks are an 
important determinant of the health insurance choices of the elderly and provide suggestive 
evidence that “word-of-mouth” information sharing may have played a role in the preference of 
some seniors for traditional indemnity insurance over managed care.  
 
1. Introduction 
The ability of consumers to discern quality differences between health plans1 is a necessary 
ingredient for the efficient operation of health insurance markets generally and is likely to be 
especially important in the non-group market where individuals cannot rely on employers to 
serve as intermediaries between themselves and their insurer. Policymakers have been 
particularly concerned about the informational demands placed on the elderly by the numerous 
and often complex health insurance options existing for retirees. Initially, these concerns were 
focused on the difficulty that many seniors experienced in choosing among the large number of 
medigap policies that were once available; indeed, it was this concern in part that led to the 
mandated consolidation of medigap into ten standardized benefit designs. However, despite this 
reform, one could argue that the informational burden on the elderly remains large due to the 
availability of private managed care plans as an additional option for Medicare beneficiaries. In 
contrast to a pure fee-for-service arrangement, the choice of a managed care plan often implies 
the choice of a specific provider, hospital, and style of care. Because many of the most important 
characteristics of both a plan and its providers are not easily observable,  seniors must find some 
source of information on which to base their decisions.  
 Exactly what information seniors have, and how it bears on their insurance choices, has 
been the subject of several recent studies. For the most part, these studies have focused on what 
might be called “formal information,” i.e., plan rankings or other constructed measures of plan 
performance.  Examples include the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) 
and the Consumer Assessment of Health Plans Study (CAHPS), both of which are available to 
Medicare beneficiaries through a website maintained by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (see Uhrig and Short (2002/2003) for details). Such studies have found mixed results in 
assessing the impact of formal information on the plan choices of the elderly. For example,
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Uhrig and Short (2002/2003) found that HEDIS- and CAHPS-derived quality information 
distributed during a laboratory experiment did not have a significant impact on the choice 
between remaining in traditional Medicare and enrolling in a Medicare HMO, although the 
information did affect the choice between HMOs for those who selected HMO coverage.   
 The mixed evidence on the value of formal information suggests that much of the 
information that elderly consumers find useful when selecting a health plan may not be available 
in the kinds of ratings used in the current generation of HEDIS and CAHPS measures2, or, 
alternatively, that official ratings simply do not carry the same weight as information conveyed 
by friends or neighbors.  This, of course, raises the question of what information seniors do use, 
and what impact, if any, such information has on their choices.  
 Several recent studies provide evidence that informal “word-of-mouth” information 
sharing, also known as social learning, is an important determinant of financial decisions in other 
contexts, leading us to conjecture that a similar phenomenon may play a role in the health 
insurance choices of retirees. For example, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) document the 
influence of social learning on the decision to invest in the stock market, while Duflo and Saez 
(2002) and Sorensen (2002) examine its impact on the choice of employer-sponsored retirement 
and health insurance plans, respectively. 
Most previous work on social learning has used data on the choices made by coworkers 
to test for the presence of peer effects among employed adults (Duflo and Saez, 2002; Sorensen, 
2002). This approach is not possible in the current context because there is no data set of which 
we are aware that provides information on peer behavior for retirees, nor is there any way to 
directly observe information flows across individuals. Instead, we follow the approach adopted 
by Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) in their study of stock market participation in which 
households are categorized in terms of their social interactions with friends and neighbors and 
participation rates among “social” and “non-social” households are compared.  
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 A potential weakness of using sociability to proxy for information exchanged through 
social networks is that such a measure may be correlated with personality traits that 
independently influence insurance choices. For example, it might be that more sociable 
households are more risk tolerant or more optimistic than less sociable households, thus making 
these households more open to purchasing newer or “riskier” insurance products, such as 
Medicare HMOs.  We attempt to address this problem in two ways. First, we include proxies for 
a variety of household attitudes as control variables in our regressions. Second, because our 
control variables may not capture all attitudinal differences that are potentially correlated with 
sociability and plan choice, we also test some subsidiary implications of the information sharing 
interpretation of our sociability variable. The first is that better educated households may find it 
easier to obtain the necessary information on their own (by reading articles in newspapers or 
magazines, for example), while less educated households may be more limited in their ability to 
process such information and, as a result, may be more likely to solicit opinions from friends and 
neighbors. The second relates to the fact that if sociability does capture information sharing as 
we hypothesize, then it should only have an impact on purchases of complex or unfamiliar 
products. We test this proposition by examining the effect of sociability on the propensity of 
households to hold life insurance and maintain a checking account.  
We find that greater social interaction, as proxied by interactions with friends and 
neighbors, reduces the likelihood of enrolling in Medicare managed care plans by about 4 
percent. Given a baseline managed care enrollment probability of 13.2 percent, this translates 
into a 30 percent relative reduction in the likelihood of an elderly household being enrolled in a 
Medicare HMO. Consistent with an information-sharing interpretation of the results, we find that 
the influence of sociability on Medicare HMO enrollment exists primarily for less educated 
people who may have a greater need to rely on others for information. We also find that while 
sociability affects the decision to enroll in a managed care plan, it does not exert a significant 
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influence on the decision to hold life insurance or maintain a checking account.  
Our results indicate that social networks are an important determinant of the health 
insurance choices of the elderly and provide suggestive evidence that word-of-mouth 
information sharing may have played a role in the preference of some seniors for fee-for-service 
insurance over managed care. Our findings also reinforce the conjectures offered in several 
earlier studies that formal sources of information may have been less effective than originally 
hoped because they fail to capture the kind of “soft” information exchanged in informal settings3, 
or because people are more apt to believe reports from friends and neighbors.  
  The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.1, we briefly review the insurance options 
available to retirees. In Section 2.2, we discuss our data. In Section 2.3, we present our main 
results and discuss several specification checks. In Section 2.4, we provide some additional 
justification for an information-sharing interpretation of our results by examining how the 
influence of sociability varies with education and product familiarity / complexity.  Concluding 
remarks are offered in Section 3. 
 
2. The Health Insurance Choices of the Elderly 
2.1. Background 
 Americans aged 65 and over have three primary health insurance options to choose 
from.4  First, they can obtain coverage exclusively through Medicare, a federal program that 
provides coverage for most medical expenses, aside from prescription drugs, provided that the 
enrollee receives both part A (hospital coverage) and part B (physician coverage). Second, 
because the Medicare program subjects beneficiaries to deductibles and co-payments, and 
imposes some coverage exclusions, most seniors have chosen to supplement their Medicare 
coverage with a private insurance policy, known as a Medicare supplement or medigap policy, 
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that partially insures them against the gaps in their Medicare coverage. Beginning in the mid-
1980s, a third option was added, which allows Medicare beneficiaries to enroll in a private 
managed care plan in lieu of obtaining coverage through the Medicare program. Medicare 
managed care plans typically provide more generous coverage than traditional Medicare, for 
example by providing more “first dollar” coverage and/or by providing partial coverage for 
prescription drugs, but at the expense of exposing seniors to the strictures of managed care, such 
as restricted choice of physicians and hospitals.  In what follows, we analyze how sociability 
influences the propensity of retirees to choose the third option (Medicare managed care), relative 
to the more traditional alternatives of stand-alone Medicare or Medicare supplemented with 
medigap.  
2.2. Data 
 Our data are taken from the 1998 Wave of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a 
longitudinal survey providing information on the demographic characteristics, health insurance 
coverage, and public program participation of the elderly and near-elderly beginning in 1992, 
with follow-up surveys conducted every two years.  The original sample is nationally 
representative of the cohort born in 1931-1941.  Beginning with Wave 4 in 1998, the HRS also 
added three new cohorts to the survey.  The first group was composed of people already being 
followed in a companion survey to the HRS, known as the Study of Assets and Health Among 
the Oldest Old (AHEAD). The AHEAD cohort consists of households with a member born in 
1923 or earlier.  The second group added were households with a member born during the period 
1924-1930, and dubbed the “Children of the Depression” cohort.  The final addition was a group 
of individuals born between 1942 and 1947, known as the “War Baby” cohort.   
 We use a single wave of the HRS in our analysis because a panel model with fixed 
effects would be based on within-household changes in sociability and insurance purchases 
between 1992 and 1998. Because sociability exhibits little variation over time, this type of 
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identification strategy was not possible. We focus on the 1998 wave, rather than the earlier 
waves, to maximize the number of respondents with Medicare coverage (due to the addition of 
the AHEAD, “Children of the Depression,” and “War Baby” cohorts).  
 The unit of observation for our analysis is the household.  This is because several 
variables of interest, most notably our sociability measure, are only asked of one member of the 
household.  Our sample consists of all households in the 1998 HRS with a member who is a 
Medicare beneficiary aged 65 or older.  The HRS provides fairly extensive information on 
survey respondents, including information on their demographic characteristics, income, wealth, 
employment status, health status, insurance holdings, and utilization of medical care. Some 
questions are asked of one household member and are designed to apply to the household as a 
whole while others are asked of each household member separately. For the latter questions, we 
create a household measure by classifying the household based on the individual response that 
would most distinguish it from the “typical” household in the data. For example, in the case of 
ethnicity, we categorize a household as being Hispanic if either member of the household reports 
being Hispanic. Similarly, for age and education we place the household in the category 
associated with the highest age and education level reported by household members. For health 
status and medical utilization, households are classified based on the lowest health status and 
highest utilization of either member.  
 Insurance holdings are likewise categorized, with households being classified as enrolled 
in a Medicare managed care plan (HMO) if either member of the household is.  If neither 
member is enrolled in a Medicare HMO, then the household is classified as having a medigap 
policy if either member holds a medigap policy. If neither member holds a medigap policy, then 
the household is classified as having “stand alone” Medicare coverage.  In our estimation 
sample, only 6 percent of households rely exclusively on Medicare; approximately 81 percent 
hold a medigap policy while 13 percent are enrolled in a Medicare HMO.5 Given that 94 percent 
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of households modify their Medicare coverage in some way, the primary variation in the data 
relates to the manner in which Medicare coverage is augmented. 
 The sociability measure we use is derived from two HRS questions. The first asks 
respondents whether they have good friends in the neighborhood.  The second asks respondents 
how many times they get together with neighbors just to chat or for a social visit.  Responses to 
the second question exhibit large mass points at zero visits (approximately 20 percent of 
households) and at one visit (approximately 60 percent of households), indicating that there are 
essentially three margins of sociability embedded in this question: no visits, one visit, and more 
than one visit.  In experimenting with the possible cut-offs, we found the relevant margin to be 
no interactions with neighbors vs. some interactions (one or more). Thus, a household is defined 
as being “sociable” if the respondent indicates the presence of friends in the neighborhood or 
indicates that they get together socially with their neighbors at least once a year. Approximately 
89 percent of households are classified as “sociable” using our criteria; thus, we are comparing 
households with any level of social interaction to those with none. This seems appropriate when 
thinking about the amount of interaction required to obtain information on health plans and is in 
keeping with the threshold used by Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) in their study of social 
interactions and stock market participation.6 
 As discussed in the Introduction, a potential weakness of using sociability to proxy for 
information sharing is that such a measure may be correlated with unobserved personality traits 
that independently influence insurance choices. One way that we attempt to address this problem 
is by including proxies for household attitudes as control variables in our regressions.7 These are 
listed collectively as “mental status” dummies in most of our results, but are described separately 
in the summary statistics listed in Table 1. The eight mental status dummies are: “felt 
depressed”; “felt everything was an effort”; “sleep was restless”; “felt happy”; “felt lonely”; “felt 
sad”; “could not get going”; and “had a lot of energy.” We expect that, as a group, these 
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variables should be correlated with personality traits that might be important for health insurance 
choices, such as optimism or a willingness to try new things.  
 We also rerun our baseline specifications adding controls for risk tolerance from Wave 1 
of the HRS merged with the Wave 4 data that we use for our analysis.  Because the risk tolerance 
measures are only available for the original HRS cohort (the 1931-1941 birth cohort), our sample 
sizes are significantly reduced due to the loss of the AHEAD, “Children of the Depression,” and 
“War Baby” cohorts.  The risk tolerance variables are constructed based on hypothetical 
questions designed by Barsky et al. (1997) for the purpose of measuring attitudes toward risk.8 
Based on their answers to these questions, households can be partitioned into four groups defined 
by two indicator variables. Because of the small sample sizes involved, we present these results 
only as a sensitivity check.  
 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our sample.9 Approximately 90 percent of the 
households in our sample are classified as white, 67 percent are married, and about 7 percent 
have at least one member who is employed in some capacity. Average household income is 
roughly $14,000 and average household wealth is $173,000. The HRS households score well on 
functional status (ability to walk several blocks, climb stairs, or bend over to pick up a dime), but 
many households have at least one member who has, or has had, a chronic medical condition (24 
percent of households have a member who has had cancer, 37 percent have a member with a 
heart condition, and 18 percent have a member who suffers from depression).  In terms of 
utilization, 46 percent of households have a member with an overnight hospital stay during the 
past two years, 15 percent have received home health care during that time, and 3 percent have 
experienced a nursing home stay.  
2.3.  Social Learning and Medicare HMO Enrollment 
 We estimate a probit model with a dependent variable taking the value “one” if a 
household has at least one member enrolled in a Medicare HMO, and “zero” otherwise.10 The 
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marginal effects reported in Table 2 indicate how a one-unit change in each explanatory variable 
affects the probability of enrolling in a Medicare HMO relative to retaining traditional Medicare 
coverage and either purchasing a medigap supplement or relying on Medicare alone.11 Column 
(1) contains controls for basic demographics. Column (2) adds indicator variables for income and 
wealth deciles and employment status (7 categories). Column (3) adds three measures of 
functional status, 11 chronic condition indicators, 8 mental status indicators, and an indicator for 
whether the household is satisfied with their health care. In column (4), we add several 
utilization variables. State dummies are included in all specifications. 
 As shown in Table 2, the effect of sociability on Medicare HMO enrollment is quite 
robust across all four specifications and is always statistically significant at the 0.01 level or 
better. Sociable households are about 4 percent less likely to have a member enrolled in a 
Medicare HMO. Given a baseline enrollment probability of 13.2 percent, this translates into a 30 
percent relative reduction in the likelihood of an elderly household having a member with 
coverage from a managed care plan, a finding which suggests that better informed retirees are 
significantly less likely to opt for the managed care alternative.  
 Before turning to our specification checks, a couple of other results are worth noting. 
Focusing on column (4) of Table 2, we find that black households are significantly more likely to 
have coverage from a Medicare HMO than white households, while those who are separated, 
widowed, or never married are significantly less likely to enroll in an HMO than those who are 
married. The interpretation of the utilization variables is complicated by their endogeneity with 
respect to the chosen insurance coverage. That said, we find a significant negative association 
between the number of overnight hospital stays and the likelihood of being enrolled in an HMO. 
It is not possible to ascertain whether this reflects favorable risk selection or the tighter 
utilization controls imposed by managed care organizations. In the same vein, we find that 
 10
having used home health care in the past two years is positively correlated with Medicare HMO 
enrollment.  
 Other variables that exert a significant influence on HMO enrollment, but which are not 
reported in Table 2, are: age (relative to the omitted category, 65-69 year olds, increasing age 
monotonically reduces the probability of HMO coverage up until age 84, after which the effect 
remains negative for 85-89 year olds, but becomes insignificant thereafter); employment status 
(relative to those who are current working, those who are unemployed and looking for work are 
significantly more likely to have HMO coverage, whereas those who are disabled, retired, or 
classified as homemakers are significantly less likely to have coverage from an HMO); and the 
presence of certain chronic medical conditions (those suffering from cataracts and depression are 
less likely to join an HMO, while those with diabetes are more likely). Looking across the 
income and wealth deciles, we generally find that both are negatively related to Medicare HMO 
enrollment, but few of the individual coefficients are statistically significant, perhaps because of 
the high degree of collinearity with other variables.  
 We also found that those who reported having “a lot of energy” were significantly more 
likely to have coverage from an HMO, a finding which, when coupled with the negative 
influence of depression on HMO enrollment, suggests that our “mental status” variables are 
picking up some of the attitudinal differences that we hoped to control for. However, the 
variables that are potentially the most important in this regard are those that measure the 
household’s tolerance for risk. As discussed previously, we have created two indicator variables 
for risk tolerance using the questions devised by Barsky et al. (1997). Unfortunately, these 
questions were only asked of those in the first wave of the HRS, which dramatically reduces the 
size of the available sample, owing to the loss of the AHEAD, “War Baby,” and “Children of the 
Depression” cohorts that were added subsequent to Wave 1. As a consequence, we do not 
include these variables in our primary regressions presented in Table 2, but instead include them 
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as a sensitivity check in Table 1A.  Columns (1)–(4) of Table 1A replicate the four specifications 
estimated in Table 2 using the Wave 1 sample. In columns (5)–(8), we estimate identical 
specifications that differ only by the incorporation of our two risk tolerance indicators. 
Comparing columns (1)–(4) to columns (5)–(8) reveals that our results are virtually identical, 
both in terms of magnitudes and statistical significance, when the risk tolerance variables are 
added. This provides some evidence that our benchmark estimates from Table 2 are unlikely to 
be biased by differences across households in attitudes toward risk.  
 As an additional robustness check, we also estimated a multinomial logit model that 
breaks out the “Medicare only” and “Medicare plus medigap” households into separate 
categories. Results for this model, which are qualitatively similar to those from the probit 
specification, are displayed in Table 2A of the Appendix. In contrast to the results for Medicare 
HMOs, where our sociability variable is statistically significant in every specification 
considered, sociability never exerts a statistically significant influence on the decision to 
purchase a medigap policy (relative to relying on Medicare alone). We view this finding as being 
consistent with an information sharing interpretation because, a priori, one would expect that 
more information would be required to enroll in a managed care plan than to choose an 
indemnity policy from among a small set of standardized insurance products. 
2.4.  Additional Evidence 
 In this section, we provide some additional evidence that our sociability measure is likely 
capturing information exchanged through social networks. We do so by testing two subsidiary 
implications of the information-sharing hypothesis. The first is based on the premise that social 
learning and other types of learning are substitutes in the sense that gaining knowledge from one 
source lessens the need to acquire information from another source. In the current context, this 
amounts to assuming that information obtained from newspapers, magazine articles, or the 
internet reduces the marginal gain from seeking information from friends and neighbors. To the 
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extent that more educated people are better able to process such information, we would expect 
that conversations with friends and neighbors would have less of an impact on their insurance 
choices.   
 We test for such an effect by re-estimating the probit models from Table 2 allowing the 
effect of sociability to vary across households with different levels of education. Results are 
presented in Table 3, where an indicator for having at least one member of the household with a 
college education is interacted with our sociability variable. Under this formulation, the effect of 
sociability on Medicare HMO enrollment among less educated households is given by the 
coefficient on the sociability variable while the effect for better educated households is given by 
the sum of the coefficients on the sociability variable and its interaction with the college 
indicator. Consistent with the above hypothesis, we find that sociability has a large and 
statistically significant effect for households without a college graduate, but essentially no effect 
for college educated households.  
 A second implication of the information sharing hypothesis is that sociability should not 
affect the decision to purchase products about which households are already well informed, or 
that are relatively simple to use. In Table 4, we focus on life insurance and checking accounts, 
two financial products which, due to their familiarity and simplicity, should not be affected by 
social interactions with friends and neighbors.  We consider life insurance as an additional check 
on the possibility that sociability could be correlated with risk aversion, notwithstanding the 
sensitivity check using the risk tolerance measures described earlier. Our examination of 
checking account usage is motivated by two possible confounders. The first is a concern that 
more sociable households might be more trusting, and therefore more willing to expose 
themselves to the restrictions associated with managed care. An admittedly weak test of this 
conjecture, but the best one available to us, is to investigate whether sociability predicts checking 
account use. Among the elderly, particularly the portion of our sample composed of the 
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“Children of the Depression” cohort, there may be a distrust of financial institutions that leads 
some households to avoid placing money in checking accounts. While households without 
checking accounts represent a relatively small portion of our sample (approximately 7.5 percent), 
it is not implausible that there could be correlation between this group and those that eschew 
social interactions. A second rationale for looking at checking account usage is that elderly 
households that do not have friends or interact with neighbors could be less financially 
sophisticated in general than more sociable households, and therefore less apt to venture beyond 
traditional Medicare coverage. This seems unlikely given that we found no effect of sociability 
on the propensity to purchase a medigap policy in our multinomial logit model, but testing for an 
effect of sociability on checking account usage provides an additional piece of evidence on this 
score. 
 Table 4 replicates the probit models estimated in Table 2, using as dependent variables 
indicators for whether a household owns a life insurance policy (approximately 82 percent of 
households) or maintains a checking account (92.5 percent of households). The results from 
these specification checks are consistent with an information sharing interpretation of our 
sociability variable; in no case does sociability exert a significant influence on the propensity to 
hold either product, and the marginal effects are below one percent in all but one specification. 
3.  Conclusions 
 In this paper, we have examined the effect of social learning on the health insurance 
decisions of the elderly by linking the observed choices of retirees to measures of their social 
interactions with others. Our results suggest that social networks may play a role in 
disseminating health insurance information among the elderly, a finding consistent with several 
recent surveys of retirees.  Specifically, we find that more sociable households, defined as those 
who have friends nearby or who interact with their neighbors, are 4 percent less likely to enroll 
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in a Medicare managed care plan. Given that only 13.2 percent of households in our sample have 
coverage from a Medicare HMO, this translates into a 30 percent relative reduction in the 
likelihood that an elderly household selects coverage from a managed care organization.  
 Our findings suggest that informal exchanges of information among the elderly may have 
played a role in the preference of some retirees for traditional indemnity insurance over managed 
care. They also provide indirect evidence that is consistent with the conjectures of several 
researchers that formal sources of information (such as HEDIS- and CAHPS-derived plan 
rankings) may have been less effective than once hoped because they are unable to capture the 
kind of “soft” information exchanged in informal settings, or because consumers are simply 
more likely to believe reports from those they know personally. More tentatively, our results 
raise the possibility that there could be multiplier effects associated with the distribution of 
quality information to retirees. Thus, if official sources of information were to improve to the 
point where they were widely used and trusted by the elderly, our findings suggest that it may be 
efficient to “piggyback” on their social networks by distributing information to only a subset of 
beneficiaries (e.g., to a randomly-selected subset of the retirees living within a given Census tract 
or block).   
 One limitation of our study is that we are not able to directly measure peer effects, as 
done by Duflo and Saez (2002) and Sorensen (2002).  To do so, we would need information on 
both the plan choices of retirees and either their geographic or social proximity; information that 
is not currently available for this group.12 Instead, we have opted for the more “reduced form” 
approach taken by Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004), in which observed choices are compared 
across households having different degrees of social interaction. While we believe that the 
evidence generated here strongly suggests an important informational role for social networks 
among the elderly, additional progress on this subject will likely require the use of data that is 
sufficiently detailed to permit the magnitude of peer effects to be estimated. 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
*  Address all correspondence to John Moran, Center for Policy Research, Syracuse University, 426 Eggers 
Hall, Syracuse, NY 13244-1020, (315) 443-9058, jmoran@maxwell.syr.edu. 
 
1. The information problem considered in this paper is related to the unobservability of certain attributes of 
health insurance plans and the ability of consumers to acquire this information from others. This is distinct 
from the problem, confronted by insurers, of determining an individual’s risk type in the presence of 
asymmetric information (see, for example, Crocker and Snow, 1985 and 1986).  
 
2. Moreover, as noted by Short et al. (2002), the quality information provided by the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services is not as finely targeted as most private-sector report cards on the specific options 
existing within a given geographic area.  
 
3. In two of the first papers to analyze the relationship between health plan report cards and observed plan 
choices (Chernew and Scanlon, 1998; Scanlon and Chernew, 1999), the authors conjecture that the absence 
of a consistent relationship between plan rankings and enrollments in a large employer group was likely 
due, in part, to friends and colleagues having provided a more comprehensive assessment of the plans than 
was possible using the early HEDIS measures. 
 
4. There are other, less common sources of insured medical care for the elderly, such as the CHAMPVA 
program for veterans. Because of the small numbers of observations, we omit these from our analysis. 
 
5. Note that our sample is not representative of Medicare beneficiaries generally for two reasons. First, the 
HRS does not provide a sample of all Medicare beneficiaries, only those who are in the age cohorts 
followed by the survey. Second, because our sociability measure varies only at the household level, our 
numbers apply to households rather than individuals. 
 
6. Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) note that, “A large body of work in sociology supports the premise of using 
these sorts of variables as measures of the extent to which households have informative interactions with 
one another.” The notion that even casual interactions among friends and neighbors can lead to substantial 
flows of information is documented by Granovetter (1983) in a survey of research on information 
exchanged through social networks, a phenomenon that he refers to as “the strength of weak ties.”  
 
7. Vistnes and Banthin (1997/98) have shown that attitudes toward medical care and risk are an important 
determinant of the decision to purchase a medigap policy. We include an indicator for whether the 
household was “satisfied with their health care” in all of our models and include measures of risk tolerance 
in sensitivity checks reported in the Appendix. 
 
8. The questions are as follows: “Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family, and you have a 
good job guaranteed to give you your current (family) income every year for life. You are given the 
opportunity to take a new and equally good job, with a 50-50 chance it will double your current (family) 
income and a 50-50 chance it will cut your (family) income by a third.  Would you take the new job?” If 
the respondent answers “yes” to this question, they are asked the following question: “Suppose that the 
chances were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income, and 50-50 that it would cut it in half.  
Would you still take the new job?” If they answered “no” to the first question, they are asked: “Suppose 
that the chances were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income, and 50-50 that it would cut it by 20 
percent.  Would you then take the new job?” 
 
9. Some of the variables used in our regressions in categorical form (e.g., income and wealth, which are each 
entered as a group of ten dummy variables in our regression models), have been converted back into 
continuous variables to provide a more accessible description of the sample. 
 
10. Results are similar using a logit or linear probability model. 
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11. Results are similar when the “Medicare only” households are dropped from the sample. 
 
12. In addition, one would need a strategy for overcoming the identification problems discussed by Manski 
(1993). 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics  
 
    
 Mean Minimum Maximum 
    
    
Dependent Variables    
    
Holds a Medigap policy 0.808 0.000 1.000 
    
Enrolled in a Medicare managed care plan 0.132 0.000 1.000 
    
Sociability Indicator    
    
Sociable 0.894 0.000 1.000 
    
Basic Demographics    
    
White 0.899 0.000 1.000 
    
Married 0.668 0.000 1.000 
    
High school graduate 0.355   0.000 1.000 
    
Some college 0.205 0.000 1.000 
    
College graduate 0.250 0.000 1.000 
    
Age 75.55 
(7.06) 
65.00 101.00 
    
Income, Wealth and Employment    
    
Income 
(dollars) 
14,437 
(39,558) 
0.00 1,053,000 
    
Wealth 
(dollars) 
172,643 
(466,562) 
-996,850 9,710,000 
    
Employed 0.066    0.000 1.000 
    
Health Status    
    
Satisfied with health care 0.056 0.000 1.000 
    
Can walk several blocks 0.840 0.000 1.000 
    
Can climb stairs 0.806 0.000 1.000 
    
Can pick up a dime 0.963 0.000 1.000 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics (continued) 
 
    
 Mean Minimum Maximum 
    
    
Diabetes 0.221 0.000 1.000 
    
Cancer 0.236 0.000 1.000 
    
Lung disease 0.159   0.000 1.000 
    
Heart condition 0.374 0.000 1.000 
    
Heart attack 0.053 0.000 1.000 
    
Angina 0.124 0.000 1.000 
    
Stroke 0.121 0.000 1.000 
    
Arthritis 0.736 0.000 1.000 
    
Broken hip 0.021 0.000 1.000 
    
Cataract 0.184 0.000 1.000 
    
Glaucoma 0.066 0.000 1.000 
    
Felt depressed 0.183   0.000 1.000 
    
Felt everything was an effort 0.293 0.000 1.000 
    
Sleep was restless 0.441   0.000 1.000 
    
Felt happy 0.898 0.000 1.000 
    
Felt lonely 0.193   0.000 1.000 
    
Felt sad 0.233 0.000 1.000 
    
Could not get going 0.314 0.000 1.000 
    
Had a lot of energy 0.649 0.000 1.000 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics (continued) 
 
    
Medical Care Utilization    
    
Overnight stay in hospital in past two years 0.455 0.000 1.000 
    
Number of overnight hospital stays in past 
two years 
0.810 
(1.482) 
0.000 25.000 
    
Stay in nursing home in past two years 0.032 0.000 1.000 
    
Number of doctor visits in past two years 13.53 
(19.93) 
0.00 700.00 
    
Home health care in past two years 0.145 0.000 1.000 
    
Notes: Standard deviations for continuous variables are in parentheses. Note that many of the variables listed 
above enter our regressions in a less parametric form. For example, race, marital status, age, income, wealth 
and employment status are specified as collections of dummy variables, as shown in Tables 2 and 3. They 
are displayed in a condensed form here to provide a more transparent picture of the sample. 
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Table 2. Effect of Sociability on the Likelihood of Enrolling in a Medicare Managed Care Plan – 
Probit Models 
 
         
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Sociability Indicator  -0.199 
(0.068) 
[-0.041] 
 -0.191 
(0.069) 
[-0.039] 
 -0.197 
(0.069) 
[-0.040] 
 -0.196 
(0.070) 
[-0.039] 
         
Basic Demographics         
         
Black  0.537 
(0.086) 
[0.133] 
 0.533 
(0.089) 
[0.130] 
 0.523 
(0.091) 
[0.125] 
 0.527 
(0.092) 
[0.126] 
         
Hispanic  0.209 
(0.130) 
[0.044] 
 0.204 
(0.130) 
[0.043] 
 0.210 
(0.133) 
[0.043] 
 0.219 
(0.136) 
[0.045] 
         
Other race  0.171 
(0.198) 
[0.036] 
 0.142 
(0.206) 
[0.029] 
 0.102 
(0.207) 
[0.020] 
 0.119 
(0.204) 
[0.023] 
         
Separated  -0.588 
(0.361) 
[-0.076] 
 -0.693 
(0.350) 
[-0.082] 
 -0.639 
(0.357) 
[-0.077] 
 -0.664 
(0.356) 
[-0.078] 
         
Divorced  -0.082 
(0.114) 
[-0.015] 
 -0.136 
(0.117) 
[-0.023] 
 -0.128 
(0.127) 
[-0.022] 
 -0.110 
(0.127) 
[-0.019] 
         
Widowed  -0.219 
(0.060) 
[-0.038] 
 -0.250 
(0.062) 
[-0.042] 
 -0.227 
(0.074) 
[-0.038] 
 -0.222 
(0.075) 
[-0.037] 
         
Never married  -0.336 
(0.181) 
[-0.051] 
 -0.352 
(0.181) 
[-0.053] 
 -0.324 
(0.189) 
[-0.048] 
 -0.338 
(0.191) 
[-0.050] 
         
High school graduate  -0.006 
(0.068) 
[-0.001] 
 -0.020 
(0.068) 
[-0.004] 
 -0.004 
(0.069) 
[-0.001] 
 0.000 
(0.070) 
[0.000] 
         
Some college  0.012 
(0.074) 
[0.002] 
 0.012 
(0.076) 
[0.002] 
 0.032 
(0.077) 
[0.006] 
 0.059 
(0.077) 
[0.011] 
         
College graduate  -0.156 
(0.075) 
[-0.028] 
 -0.132 
(0.079) 
[-0.024] 
 -0.102 
(0.081) 
[-0.018] 
 -0.088 
(0.082) 
[-0.016] 
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Table 2. Effect of Sociability on the Likelihood of Enrolling in a Medicare Managed Care Plan – 
Probit Models (continued) 
 
         
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
8 five-year age dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
State dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Income, Wealth and 
Employment 
        
         
Income dummies 
(deciles) 
 No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Wealth dummies 
(deciles) 
 No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
7 employment status 
dummies 
 No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Health Status         
         
Satisfied with health care  --  --  0.149 
(0.096) 
[0.030] 
 0.155 
(0.097) 
[0.031] 
         
Can walk several blocks  --  --  -0.106 
(0.082) 
[-0.020] 
 -0.085 
(0.083) 
[-0.016] 
         
Can climb stairs  --  --  0.004 
(0.071) 
[0.001] 
 -0.010 
(0.071) 
[-0.002] 
         
Can pick up a dime  --  --  -0.199 
(0.144) 
[-0.041] 
 -0.211 
(0.152) 
[-0.043] 
         
11 chronic condition 
dummies 
 No   No  Yes  Yes 
         
8 mental status dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes 
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Table 2. Effect of Sociability on the Likelihood of Enrolling in a Medicare Managed Care Plan – 
Probit Models (continued) 
 
         
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Medical Care Utilization         
         
Overnight stay in hospital 
in past two years 
 --  --  --  0.005 
(0.063) 
[0.001] 
         
Number of overnight 
hospital stays in past two 
years 
 --  --  --  -0.060 
(0.023) 
[-0.011] 
         
Stay in nursing home in 
past two years 
 --  --  --  0.068 
(0.150) 
[0.013] 
         
Number of doctor visits 
in past two years 
 --  --  --  -0.003 
(0.002) 
[-0.001] 
         
Home health care in past 
two years 
 --  --  --  0.230 
(0.078) 
[0.046] 
         
         
R-squared  0.134  0.143  0.152  0.156 
         
N  6271  6269  6243  6178 
         
Notes: The dependent variable equals “one” if at least one member of the household is enrolled in a 
Medicare managed care plan. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Marginal effects are in brackets.  
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Table 3. Effect of Sociability on the Likelihood of Enrolling in a Medicare Managed Care Plan – 
Difference-in-Differences Models 
 
         
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Sociability Indicator  -0.269 
(0.077) 
[-0.058] 
 -0.264 
(0.078) 
[-0.056] 
 -0.271 
(0.079) 
[-0.056] 
 -0.268 
(0.079) 
[-0.056] 
         
College graduate  -0.415 
(0.166) 
[-0.070] 
 -0.403 
(0.171) 
[-0.067] 
 -0.372 
(0.170) 
[-0.061] 
 -0.353 
(0.172) 
[-0.058] 
         
Sociability Indicator × 
College graduate 
 0.291 
(0.170) 
[0.060] 
 0.304 
(0.171) 
[0.062] 
 0.303 
(0.170) 
[0.061] 
 0.296 
(0.171) 
[0.059] 
         
Column-specific controls 
included 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
R-squared  0.135  0.143  0.153  0.157 
         
N  6271  6269  6243  6178 
         
Notes: The dependent variable equals “one” if at least one member of the household is enrolled in a 
Medicare managed care plan. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Marginal effects are in brackets. 
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Table 4. Effect of Sociability on Holdings of More Familiar Financial Products 
 
           
  Holds Life Insurance Policy  Maintains Checking Account 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
           
Sociability Indicator  0.046 
(0.066) 
[0.011] 
0.032 
(0.066) 
[0.008] 
0.012 
(0.067) 
[0.003] 
0.017 
(0.067) 
[0.004] 
 0.069 
(0.082) 
[0.008] 
0.039 
(0.084) 
[0.004] 
0.010 
(0.085) 
[0.001] 
0.007 
(0.086) 
[0.001] 
           
Column-specific controls 
included 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
R-squared  0.112 0.122 0.132 0.131  0.097 0.131 0.142 0.137 
           
N  6356 6342 6318 6254  6197 6169 6144 5946 
           
Notes: The dependent variable equals “one” if at least one member of the household holds a life insurance policy (81.78 percent of the sample) or maintains 
a checking account (92.52 percent of the sample), respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Marginal effects are in brackets. 
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Table 1A. Effect of Sociability on the Likelihood of Enrolling in a Medicare Managed Care Plan - 
Sensitivity to Inclusion of HRS Risk Tolerance Measures 
 
           
  Without Controls for Risk Tolerance  With Risk Tolerance Controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
           
Sociability Indicator  -0.303 
(0.160) 
[-0.077] 
-0.299 
(0.163) 
[-0.075] 
-0.392 
(0.161) 
[-0.097] 
-0.391 
(0.160) 
[-0.093] 
 -0.303 
(0.160) 
[-0.076] 
-0.302 
(0.163) 
[-0.076] 
-0.392 
(0.161) 
[-0.097] 
-0.392 
(0.160) 
[-0.093] 
           
First risk tolerance 
indicator  
 -- -- -- --  -0.185 
(0.178) 
[-0.038] 
-0.208 
(0.170) 
[-0.041] 
-0.189 
(0.173) 
[-0.036] 
-0.197 
(0.172) 
[-0.036] 
           
Second risk tolerance 
indicator  
 -- -- -- --  0.264 
(0.135) 
[0.065] 
0.196 
(0.141) 
[0.047] 
0.169 
(0.146) 
[0.038] 
0.140 
(0.151) 
[0.030] 
           
Column-specific controls 
included 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
R-squared  0.154 0.183 0.217 0.241  0.158 0.186 0.219 0.243 
           
N  1240 1222 1216 1210  1240 1222 1216 1210 
           
Notes: The dependent variable equals “one” if at least one member of the household is enrolled in a Medicare managed care plan. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. Marginal effects are in brackets. 
 
 26
 
Table 2A. Effect of Sociability on the Likelihood of Medicare Supplementation - Multinomial Logit Models 
 
           
  Holds Medigap Policy  Enrolled in a Medicare MC plan 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
           
Sociability Indicator  0.001 
(0.128) 
[0.017] 
0.014 
(0.128) 
[0.018] 
0.050 
(0.131) 
[0.024] 
0.050 
(0.132) 
[0.024] 
 -0.380 
(0.159) 
[-0.020] 
-0.358 
(0.161) 
[-0.019] 
-0.349 
(0.164) 
[-0.021] 
-0.350 
(0.165) 
[-0.021] 
           
Basic Demographics           
           
Black  -0.734 
(0.151) 
[-0.160] 
-0.641 
(0.157) 
[-0.143] 
-0.584 
(0.161) 
[-0.133] 
-0.589 
(0.163) 
[-0.134] 
 0.426 
(0.180) 
[0.072] 
0.497 
(0.187) 
[0.071] 
0.529 
(0.193) 
[0.071] 
0.524 
(0.196) 
[0.071] 
           
Hispanic  0.030 
(0.292) 
[-0.014] 
-0.030 
(0.293) 
[-0.020] 
0.054 
(0.288) 
[-0.011] 
0.048 
(0.288) 
[-0.012] 
 0.393 
(0.317) 
[0.020] 
0.339 
(0.317) 
[0.020] 
0.397 
(0.320) 
[0.019] 
0.407 
(0.325) 
[0.020] 
           
Other race  -0.196 
(0.338) 
[-0.036] 
-0.146 
(0.343) 
[-0.026] 
-0.119 
(0.342) 
[-0.020] 
-0.141 
(0.345) 
[-0.024] 
 0.120 
(0.423) 
[0.015] 
0.090 
(0.443) 
[0.011] 
0.048 
(0.422) 
[0.007] 
0.070 
(0.418) 
[0.009] 
           
Separated  -0.242 
(0.571) 
[0.017] 
-0.092 
(0.567) 
[0.040] 
-0.007 
(0.599) 
[0.045] 
-0.010 
(0.599) 
[0.046] 
 -1.358 
(0.870) 
[-0.053] 
-1.364 
(0.875) 
[-0.058] 
-1.165 
(0.882) 
[-0.053] 
-1.193 
(0.892) 
[-0.054] 
           
Divorced  -0.082 
(0.259) 
[-0.004] 
0.068 
(0.255) 
[0.018] 
0.081 
(0.236) 
[0.019] 
0.111 
(0.240) 
[0.021] 
 -0.221 
(0.296) 
[-0.007] 
-0.211 
(0.299) 
[-0.012] 
-0.187 
(0.305) 
[-0.012] 
-0.129 
(0.306) 
[-0.010] 
           
Widowed  0.033 
(0.096) 
[0.022] 
0.120 
(0.102) 
[0.034] 
0.151 
(0.125) 
[0.036] 
0.153 
(0.126) 
[0.036] 
 -0.428 
(0.140) 
[-0.021] 
-0.421 
(0.146) 
[-0.024] 
-0.355 
(0.176) 
[-0.023] 
-0.356 
(0.178) 
[-0.023] 
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Table 2A. Effect of Sociability on the Likelihood of Medicare Supplementation - Multinomial Logit Models (continued) 
 
           
  Holds Medigap Policy  Enrolled in a Medicare MC plan 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
           
Never married  0.081 
(0.268) 
[0.036] 
0.209 
(0.272) 
[0.052] 
0.208 
(0.284) 
[0.051] 
0.206 
(0.289) 
[0.052] 
 -0.609 
(0.404) 
[-0.031] 
-0.537 
(0.409) 
[-0.033] 
-0.525 
(0.426) 
[-0.033] 
-0.554 
(0.431) 
[-0.034] 
           
High school graduate  -0.202 
(0.127) 
[-0.023] 
-0.212 
(0.130) 
[-0.022] 
-0.196 
(0.129) 
[-0.021] 
-0.210 
(0.132) 
[-0.023] 
 -0.194 
(0.164) 
[-0.001] 
-0.233 
(0.166) 
[-0.002] 
-0.187 
(0.166) 
[-0.001] 
-0.184 
(0.168) 
[0.000] 
           
Some college  -0.182 
(0.136) 
[-0.023] 
-0.209 
(0.139) 
[-0.025] 
-0.219 
(0.141) 
[-0.028] 
-0.232 
(0.143) 
[-0.031] 
 -0.133 
(0.175) 
[0.001] 
-0.160 
(0.179) 
[0.001] 
-0.126 
(0.182) 
[0.003] 
-0.082 
(0.184) 
[0.006] 
           
College graduate  -0.188 
(0.135) 
[-0.011] 
-0.240 
(0.139) 
[-0.018] 
-0.228 
(0.144) 
[-0.018] 
-0.236 
(0.146) 
[-0.020] 
 -0.470 
(0.179) 
[-0.013] 
-0.472 
(0.187) 
[-0.012] 
-0.397 
(0.193) 
[-0.009] 
-0.376 
(0.195) 
[-0.008] 
           
8 five-year age dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
State dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Income, Wealth and 
Employment 
          
           
Income dummies 
(deciles) 
 No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
           
Wealth dummies  
(deciles) 
 No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2A. Effect of Sociability on the Likelihood of Medicare Supplementation - Multinomial Logit Models (continued) 
 
           
  Holds Medigap Policy  Enrolled in a Medicare MC plan 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
           
7 employment status 
dummies 
 No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
           
Health Status           
           
Satisfied with health care  -- -- 0.030 
(0.180) 
[-0.007] 
0.023 
(0.181) 
[-0.008] 
 -- -- 0.294 
(0.216) 
[0.012] 
0.290 
(0.218) 
[0.012] 
           
Can walk several blocks  -- -- 0.139 
(0.134) 
[0.024] 
0.143 
(0.136) 
[0.023] 
 -- -- -0.099 
(0.188) 
[-0.010] 
-0.058 
(0.191) 
[-0.008] 
           
Can climb stairs  -- -- -0.255 
(0.119) 
[-0.029] 
-0.256 
(0.120) 
[-0.028] 
 -- -- -0.185 
(0.167) 
[0.002] 
-0.211 
(0.168) 
[0.000] 
           
Can pick up a dime  -- -- -0.239 
(0.254) 
[-0.010] 
-0.203 
(0.261) 
[-0.006] 
 -- -- -0.609 
(0.354) 
[-0.019] 
-0.584 
(0.381) 
[-0.019] 
           
11 chronic condition 
dummies 
 No No Yes Yes  No  No Yes Yes 
           
8 mental status dummies  No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
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Table 2A. Effect of Sociability on the Likelihood of Medicare Supplementation - Multinomial Logit Models (continued) 
 
           
  Holds Medigap Policy  Enrolled in a Medicare MC plan 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
           
Medical Care Utilization           
           
Overnight stay in hospital 
in past two years 
 -- -- -- 0.004 
(0.104) 
[0.000] 
 -- -- -- 0.008 
(0.146) 
[0.000] 
           
Number of overnight 
hospital stays in past two 
years 
 -- -- -- -0.010 
(0.029) 
[0.003] 
 -- -- -- -0.109 
(0.049) 
[-0.005] 
           
Stay in nursing home in 
past two years 
 -- -- -- 0.441 
(0.288) 
[0.043] 
 -- -- -- 0.512 
(0.389) 
[0.006] 
           
Number of doctor visits 
in past two years 
 -- -- -- 0.002 
(0.002) 
[0.000] 
 -- -- -- -0.004 
(0.004) 
[0.000] 
           
Home health care in past 
two years 
 -- -- -- -0.047 
(0.144) 
[-0.021] 
 -- -- -- 0.348 
(0.189) 
[0.018] 
           
R-squared  0.117 0.126 0.138 0.141  0.117 0.126 0.138 0.141 
           
N  6426 6424 6398 6333  6426 6424 6398 6333 
           
Notes: The estimates are from a multinomial logit model with three categories: enrolled in a Medicare managed care plan (13.2 percent of the sample); 
holds a medigap policy (80.8 percent of the sample); has coverage exclusively from Medicare (the omitted category; 6 percent of the sample). Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Marginal effects are in brackets. 
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